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ABSTRACT
This study examines the accrual-based and real earnings management tolerance of auditors in boardrooms of politically 
connected companies using auditor reputation theory and auditor litigation risk as the theoretical framework. Using 
a sample of 89 Nigerian listed companies during the period from 2008 to 2013, the study finds that auditors tolerate 
more accrual earnings management and less real earnings management in companies that are politically connected. In 
addition, the study finds a complementary relationship between real earnings management (REM) and abnormal earnings 
management (ABD) in companies that are politically connected. The findings of this study have serious implications for 
regulators, particularly following the various corporate governance scandals that have affected the integrity of financial 
information. 
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of earnings 
management tolerance among auditors in firms that have 
board members who are politically connected. This study 
is motivated by the extent of earnings manipulation by 
managers and the alleged tolerance of external auditors 
that have received the attention of both academicians and 
regulators (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; Nigeria Code of 
Corporate Governance 2003). Questions have frequently 
been asked regarding the ability of auditors to curtail the 
manipulative tendencies of managers that have, on several 
occasions, resulted in corporate collapses both in Nigeria 
and abroad. In particular, auditors are typically alleged of 
having conspired with managers to manipulate financial 
reports because the audited financial statement of an audit 
client represents the outcome of an audit process determined 
through “auditor-client negotiation” (Gibbins, Salterio & 
Webb 2001). Therefore, since one of the primary duties of 
an auditor is to curtail the aggressive reporting of managers 
(Cohen et al. 2013), the audited financial statement captures 
the level of reporting discretion and the earnings quality that 
an auditor’s judgement permits his or her client (Antle & 
Nalebuff 1991). Accrual quality is a metric that is frequently 
used by researchers to capture the extent of an auditor’s 
tolerance of a client’s opportunistic reporting behaviour 
(DeFond & Zhang 2014; Jamal & Tan 2010). 
 The present study makes a conceptual contribution to 
extant research concerning the role of political economy in 
the financial reporting process. The influence of political 
connectedness on firm outcomes has received empirical 
attention. Some studies (e.g., Faccio 2006; Johnson 
& Mitton 2003) concerning firm political connection 
examine how firm political connectedness enhances firm 
performance, while others investigate how firm political 
connectedness affects the flow of information in companies 
(e.g., Guedhami, Pittman & Saffar 2014; Piotroski, Wong & 
Zhang 2015). More recently, studies, investigate how firm 
political connectedness influences the choice of auditor 
(e.g., Abdulmalik, Shittu & Che Ahmad 2016; Guedhami 
et al. 2014; Che Ahmad, Houghton & Yusof 2006). To the 
best of our knowledge, no study, with the exception of 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010), investigates how 
the consequence of the earnings management choice of 
managers influences an earnings management tolerance 
of auditors in regards to politically connected firms. 
 Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) investigate 
the accrual choices made by managers of outsourcing 
firms that are politically connected using the quarterly 
data of sampled companies. The present study expands 
upon existing literature by investigating the earnings 
management tolerance of auditors in politically connected 
firms. Accordingly, the study utilises the annual data of 
sampled companies. In addition, extant literature presents 
evidence that managers manage real activities when their 
ability to manage earnings through accruals is constrained 
(Chi, Lisic & Pevzner 2011). Real earnings management 
involves earnings management through real activities, 
such as giving price discounts, over production in order to 
report lower costs of goods sold and reduce discretionary 
expenses (Roychowdhury 2006). Additionally, real 
earnings management is not easily detectable (Graham, 
Harvey & Rajgopal 2005). Accordingly, the present study, 
in addition to the previous investigation of accrual earnings 
management by Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010), 
employs real earnings management techniques to capture 
the influence of reputational risk and litigation risks on 
auditors’ negotiating skills during the production stage of 
a financial statement for politically connected firms. 
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 Furthermore, the present study examines the 
interaction between accrual-based earnings management 
and real earnings management as suggested by Kim, 
Liu and Zheng (2012). In order to obtain valid empirical 
evidence, it is necessary to examine the interaction 
between accrual earnings management and real activities 
manipulation in order to establish whether politically 
connected boards substitute one method for another or 
use them in a complementary fashion. The examination 
of the interaction between accrual earnings management 
and real activities manipulation is important because of 
the high public attention and regulatory scrutiny to which 
politically connected firms are subjected (Guedhami et al. 
2014; Chaney, Faccio & Parsley 2011), as well as the fact 
that politically connected firms could opt for real earnings 
management that is less easily detectable by auditors. 
Although extant studies provide evidence that managers 
substitute accrual earnings management as a proxy for real 
earnings management (e.g., Cohen, Dye & Lys 2008; Zang 
2011), Chen, Huang and Fan (2012) report that managers 
use the two earnings management proxies simultaneously. 
To the best of our knowledge, no theoretical evidence exists 
that shows whether a relationship exists between accrual 
earnings management and real earnings management 
in a politically connected boardroom. Therefore, this 
study further complements discussions concerning firms 
switching between real earnings management and accrual 
earnings management based upon the perceived costs 
and benefits of both procedures in politically connected 
boardrooms.
 An empirical investigation of this nature is important 
due to heightened tensions regarding the reporting 
incentive of politically connected firms. Studies concerning 
political economy predict that the political connectedness 
of firms is significant in explaining the variation in the 
quality of reported earnings for a firm because politically 
connected firms are generally perceived as exhibiting 
high agency problems (Wahab et al. 2009). The reason 
for the high agency costs lies in the fact that insiders in 
politically connected firms are incentivised to suppress 
information contained in their financial statements with 
the aim of maximising the private benefits of insiders 
(Guedhami et al. 2014; Shleifer & Vishny 1994). Similarly, 
politically connected firms could temporarily suppress bad 
information in response to political events and hasten the 
disclosure of good news, (Piotroski et al. 2015). While 
Guedhami et al. (2014) confirm the existence of agency 
problems associated with politically connected firms, they 
argue that the benefits of transparency for low finance 
costs and high market value accounting reporting could 
cause insiders in such firms to refrain from self-serving 
behaviour, which could result in the appointment of Big 
4 auditors that serves as a signal of their commitment to 
sound financial reporting. 
 Nigeria offers a unique institutional setting for testing 
and analysing the objective of this study. Political cronyism 
is an observable phenomenon in Nigeria. About 75% of 
Nigerian board chairs are politically connected (Ujunwa, 
Salami & Umar 2013) and the ownership structure is highly 
concentrated (Adegbite 2015). According to Ujunwa et 
al. (2013), board chairmen are mostly either past army 
generals or individuals close to high-ranking government 
officials. Additionally, Nigeria is on the high side of 
corruption rankings (136 out of 176 countries as reported 
by Transparency International in 2014). Furthermore, 
political cronyism in politically connected firms is endemic 
as insiders often engage in rent-seeking activities (Faccio 
2006). 
 The remaining part of this study is organised as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the 
empirical models, while Section 4 reports on the sample, 
descriptive results and results of empirical analysis. Section 
5 concludes the study. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In the audit service market, the audited financial statement 
is a readily observable outcome of an audit engagement 
based upon which the quality of audit service could be 
assessed. According to Gibbins et al., (2001), this outcome 
is the product of a joint negotiation between the client and 
auditor, which will subsequently influence the quality of 
the financial statement. As Asthana and Boone (2012) 
note, the party with more bargaining power receives 
more concessions at the negotiation stage. During client-
auditor negotiations, evidence indicates that self-interest 
challenges auditors’ negotiating power in a competitive 
market for audit services, wherein client fees determine 
auditors’ economic survival (Windsor & Kavanagh 2012). 
The economic power of the audit client strengthens the 
client’s negotiating power. As a result, the client is able to 
receive more concessions with respect to a higher level of 
earnings management tolerance on the part of the auditor 
(Asthana & Boone 2012). 
 With respect to the link between politically connected 
firms and an auditor’s tolerance of his or her client’s 
earnings management practice, agency theory predicts that 
auditors of a politically connected firm are more likely than 
auditors of a non-politically connected firm to have high 
level of earnings management tolerance. Several studies 
provide evidence that politically connected firms have 
poor financial reporting quality. For example, Chaney et al. 
(2011) find that level of accrual quality in connected firms 
is poorer than the accrual quality level of non-connected 
firms. The findings of extant research concerning financial 
reporting are consistent with the notion that managers 
of connected firms want to conceal their expropriation 
activities by distorting the content of the financial statement 
(Chaney et al. 2011). 
 In China, Qian, Pan and Yeung (2011) find that 
expropriation activities of insiders are more severe in 
politically connected firms. In the United States, Ramanna 
and Roychowdhury (2010) document that outsourcing 
firms with political connections exhibit income decreasing 
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discretionary accruals by using accounting choices to 
manage their political costs, thus protecting the political 
interests of their candidate during an election period. 
It follows that, by virtue of the distortionary activities 
arising from the expropriation of the interests of outside 
shareholders and the need to safeguard the best interests of 
their political allies, connected firms are likely to engage 
the services of an auditor who will, to some extent, grant 
concessions during the negotiation stage (Abdulmalik et 
al. 2016).
 Managers of politically connected firms can 
opportunistically manage earnings by managing accrual 
or real activities (Cohen et al. 2008). The present study 
argues that an auditor’s tolerance of any of the earnings 
management methods will be influenced by the client 
choice of earnings management proxy as well as the 
auditor’s reputation and litigation risk (Sohn 2011). The 
accrual earnings management falls within the Generally 
Acceptable Accounting Practices (GAAP), which is utilised 
towards the accounting year-end, but before the issuance of 
the annual report, when the managers can ascertain that their 
earnings meet set targets (Gunny 2010). The management 
of earnings through accrual earnings management does 
not have any direct consequences on firms’ operating 
cash flows. However, earnings management, through real 
activities, involves the alteration of real activities, such as 
(e.g., research and development costs; costs of production 
and selling; administrative costs; and distribution 
costs) with the intent of meeting earnings benchmarks 
(Roychowdhury 2006). Real earnings management offers 
more flexibility and managers employ it throughout 
the fiscal year, although, when compared to the accrual 
earnings management, it has direct consequences on the 
current and future cash flows; and severe consequences 
on future stock performance (Gunny 2010). Due to its low 
detection rate by auditors, managers have a high preference 
for real earnings management, particularly when their 
ability to manage earnings through accruals is constrained 
by stringent regulations and audit quality (Graham et al. 
2005). 
 Although both earnings management strategies have 
consequences on an auditor’s litigation and reputational 
risk, the consequences of real earnings management are 
more severe since they distort the firms’ long-term cash 
flow generating abilities. In the unpublished work of 
Sohn (2011), the author finds that auditors consider the 
implication of their client’s earnings management choice 
through real activities manipulation in their pricing 
decision. Sohn (2011) reports a positive association 
between audit fees and real earnings management and that 
the relationship exceeds the effect of accrual and other 
earnings management proxies, most specifically for firms 
with internal control problems (i.e., agency problems). 
The findings of Sohn (2011) resonate with the assertion by 
Kim and Park (2009) that auditors are concerned with their 
client’s real earnings management activities. Accordingly, 
auditors charge more audit fees to compensate for the 
litigation risks associated with clients that extensively 
engage in real activities manipulation. Therefore, due 
to the inherent agency costs associated with politically 
connected firms and the risk created by the manipulation of 
real earnings activities by managers, auditors of politically 
connected firms will have greater incentives to tolerate 
earnings management practices that have less impact on the 
future earnings of their client. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses are developed: 
H1:  The tolerance for accrual-based earnings management 
is higher in politically connected firms than in non-
politically connected firms.
H2:  The tolerance of auditors for real earnings management 
is lower in politically connected firm than in non-
politically connected firms. 
 The next objective of this study is to examine the 
interaction between accrual-based earnings management 
and real earnings management in a politically connected 
setting. To do so, the study tests whether politically 
connected boards use these two methods as a complement 
or a substitute. Cohen, et al. (2008) provides evidence 
suggesting a shift between accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management in the pre- and post-SOX 
period. They find a decrease in the level of accrual earnings 
activities after SOX and a subsequent increase in real 
earnings activities during the same period. Chi et al.,(2011) 
also document that firms switch from accrual earnings 
management to real earnings management when audited 
by high-quality auditors. The findings of both studies add 
weight to the claim that managers switch between accrual 
earnings management and real earnings management to 
avoid detection. Likewise Roychowdhury, Kothari and 
Mizik (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provide 
evidence concerning whether the trade-off between real 
earnings management and accrual earnings management 
is explained by corporate events, such as a Seasoned 
Equity Offering (SEO). The findings of both studies 
indicate that SEO firms employ real earnings management 
to window-dress earnings. In another study, Zang (2011) 
provides evidence suggesting that managers alternate 
between accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management depending on the benefit of an individual 
method of earnings management, irrespective of corporate 
events or a specific period. 
 As gleaned from above, empirical evidence concerning 
the relationship between accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management is conflicting. For example, 
Cohen, et al. (2008) and Zang (2011) indicate a substituting 
relationship between accrual earnings management and real 
earnings management, while Chen et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that suggests a complementary relationship 
between both methods. However, in the absence of extant 
empirical evidence investigating the relationship existing 
between abnormal accrual earnings management and 
real earnings management in the context of a politically 
connected board, the present study predicts the relationship 
using the following non-directional hypothesis: 
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H3: A relationship exists between accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management in a 
politically connected firm 
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The study follows the approach of Ashbaugh, LaFond and 
Mayhew (2003), which tests the independence impairment 
of auditors. The panel regression models are presented in 
Equation 1, Equation 2 and Equation 3. This study adopts 
the Feasible GLS (FGLS) estimations techniques that correct 
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity 
problems in panel data.
Equation 1 uses Absolute Discretionary Accrual (ABD) as 
an earnings management measure. 
 ABD = αit + β1PCBit + β2LOSSit + β3SIZEit + 
  β4BIGit + β5LOGAFit + β6GROWTHit + 
  β7BLCKHLDit + β8ACCTNSTDit + 
β9QUICKit + β10RLAGit + β11BUSYit + 
  β12NONEXECit + β13INDUSTRYit + 
β14YEARit + εit + μit
  (1)
Equation 2 uses Real Earnings Management (REM) as an 
earnings management measure. 
 
  REM = αit + β1PCBit + β2LOSSit + β3SIZEit + 
  β4BIGit + β5LOGAFit + β6GROWTHit +  
  β7BLCKHLDit + β8ACCTNSTDit + 
β9QUICKit + β10RLAGit + β11BUSYit + 
  β12NONEXECit + β13INDUSTRYit + 
β14YEARit + εit + μit
  (2)
Equation 3 tests the relationship among the three proxies 
of REM and ABD in a politically connected board (PCB). 
 
 REM = αit + β1ABDit + β2PCBit + β3ABD * PCBit + 
  β4LOSSit + β5SIZEit + β6BIGit + β7LOGAFit +
  β8GROWTHit + β9BLCKHLDit +
  β10ACCNTNSTDit + β11QUICKit + 
  β12RLAGit + β13BUSYit + β14NONEXECit +  
β15INDUSTRYit + β16YEARit + εit + μit
  (3)
CONSTRUCTION OF AND VARIABLE
Discretionary accrual earnings management is estimated 
using the performance matched cross-sectional model of 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). Performance matched 
accrual is necessary in order to control for firm extreme 
performance. Thus, consistent with Kothari et al. (2005), 
ROA is included as an explanatory variable in the accrual 
model. Following previous studies, such as Warfield, Wild 
and Wild (1995) and Frankel et al. (2002), the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals is used as it captures the 
effect of both income increasing and income-decreasing 
accrual earnings management. The model is described, 
below, in Equation 1.
 
 (1) 
Where:
TA = total accruals computed as the difference 
between earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and operating cash flows
Assett-1 = lagged of total assets 
∆REV = change in revenues 
∆REC = change in receivables 
PPE = property, plant and equipment 
ROAt-1 = lagged return on assets calculated as net income 
before extraordinary items of the prior period 
divided by lagged total assets. 
 Discretionary accruals (DA) are residuals obtained 
from Equation 1 consistent with Mitra, Deis and Hossain 
(2009); and the cross-sectional regression is run for each 
industry and year.
CONSTRUCTION OF RM VARIABLE
Because firms are likely to employ real operational 
activities to manipulate earnings when their ability to 
manage through the use of a discretionary method is 
constrained due to strict regulations (Roychowdhury 
2006), real earnings management activities are examined 
over the sample period. Roychowdhury (2006) proxies 
are adopted for real earnings management estimation. 
The normal level of cash flow from operation (CFO) is 
generated for each industry and year using Equation 2 
below: 
 
  
 (2) 
 Where all other variables are as previously defined 
except for:
CFOit = the actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO 
calculated using the estimated from equation 2.
Salest = sales during period t 
Δsalesit = Salest – Salest-1
 Next, the normal level of discretionary expenses was 
modelled using equation 3 
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  (3) 
 All the variables in the model are defined previously 
except for;
DISCit =  DISC is discretionary expenditures calculated as 
the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses 
and selling, general, and administrative expenses. 
 In addition, the normal level of production cost is 
estimated as:
 
 
Note: Abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are the difference 
between the actual value and the normal levels predicted 
in Equations (2), (3), and (4). 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
POPULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE
The sample firms examined in this study include all firms 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. This study uses 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange fact book to identify all 
Nigerian firms listed on the Exchange from 2008 to 2013. 
This period is selected because of the two significant 
regulatory reforms within this period that affected financial 
reporting and corporate governance in Nigeria. Meanwhile, 
financial institutions (e.g., insurance, micro finance banks 
and commercial banks) are excluded from this study 
due to their special features and regulatory framework. 
For the purposes of estimating the earning management 
proxy, industries with less than 10 observations are 
eliminated. All the required financial and non-financial 
information are collected from the annual reports of the 
sampled companies. The final sample is comprised of 409 
observations grouped into five industries. A summary of 
the sample selection criteria is reported in Table 2.
 Table 3 reports the descriptive information for 
the trend of political connections for each of the years 
from 2008 to 2013. From the definition in the variable 
description table, political connection is an indicator 
variable indicating the presence of at least one member 
of the board who has social ties with a top government 
functionary who is currently either serving or has served in 
a past government administration, which includes present 
and past high ranking military officers. As shown in Table 
3, the percentage of firms with political connections in 
the sample ranged from 63% in 2008 to 61% percent in 
2013. Over the years, the average percentage of politically 
connected firms was 61%, which indicates a stable and 
balanced distribution of the proportion of politically 
connected boards to non-politically connected boards. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables 
of interest and other firm specific characteristics for the 
sampled companies (sampled observations of politically 
connected firms = 248 and sampled observations of 
non-connected firms = 161). Table 4 shows that, for the 
TABLE 1. Variable description of independent variables in regression model
Variable Description 
ABD
REM
PCB
ABD*PCB
LOSS
SIZE
BIG4
LOGAF
GROWTH 
BLCKHLD
ACCTNSTD
QUICK
RLAG
BUSY
NONEXC_
INDUSTRY EFFECT
YEAR EFFECT
εit
μit
Absolute discretionary accruals.
Real earnings management measures proxy of abnormal level of expenses (ABEXP) and abnormal level of 
cash flow (ABNCFO). 
A dummy variable that equals 1 for a board with directors who are politically connected and 0 if otherwise. 
Interaction term between ABD and PCB to examine the relationship between ABD and REM in a politically 
connected boardroom.
A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that have a net income of less than 1. 
Natural logarithms of total assets as a proxy for firm size. 
A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 if otherwise. 
Natural logarithms of audit fees. 
Change in sales for firm i from t-1 to t. 
Block shareholdings by individuals. 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for financial statements drawn using IFRS and 0 if otherwise. 
The ratio of current assets less inventory divided current liabilities.
Number of days between the financial year-end and the date the annual report was signed. 
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 for firms with December and March as the financial year-end. 
Total non-executive directors scaled by the total number of directors inside the boardroom. 
Industry specific fixed effect
Year specific fixed effect
Unobserved time invariant individual specific effect 
Idiosyncratic error term 
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abnormal accrual variable (ABD), the mean estimates 
for the sample of politically connected boards (PCB) 
are significantly lower than the mean estimates for the 
sample of non-politically connected firm. Comparing the 
standard deviation (SD) estimates, the median estimates 
for politically connected firms (PCB) are significantly 
higher than the SD estimates for non-politically connected 
(NON-PCB) firms. For the real earnings management (RM) 
variables (ABEXP and ABNCFO), the mean estimates for the 
sample of PCB (-1.523 and -1.753 respectively) are higher, 
although not significantly different from NON-PCBs (-0.723 
and -1.463 respectively). In addition, Table 4 shows that all 
control variables are not significantly different for PCB and 
NON-PCB, with the exception of NONEXE_, RLAG, BLCKHLD, 
AF and TA. From Table 4, TA for PCB is significantly larger 
than TA for NON-PCB (TA=37,400,000 and 12,100,000, 
respectively); and audit fees are NGN 21,594.39 and NGN 
11,862.39, respectively, for PCB and NON-PCB. 
 Pearson correlation estimates among the variables 
are reported in Table 5. The correlation between among 
the variables is relatively low with the exception of a few 
variables, such as ABNCFO and ABD, which are highly 
correlated at 0.679; LOGAF and BIG4, which are highly 
correlated at 0.545; and LOGAF and LOGTA, which are 
correlated at 0.758. However, all variables are less than 
the threshold value of 0.80 (Gujarati 2004). Furthermore, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) test is conducted to 
determine whether multicollinearity problems may be 
present. As displayed in Table 6, the mean VIF is 1.45, 
which is lower than the threshold of 10; and the individual 
VIF results are lower than the threshold of 5 (Gujarati 2004). 
Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section of the study reports and discusses the 
results of the hypotheses concerning the association 
between politically connected boards and earnings 
management (accrual earnings management and real 
earnings management). Table 6 presents the results from 
estimating Equation 1 and Equation 2 along with the full 
set of control variables. For the abnormal accrual earnings 
management model (ABD), the coefficient estimates for a 
politically connected board (PCB) are positively significant 
at the .05 level (0.400). This finding suggests that the level 
of accrual earnings management tolerance by auditors 
of a politically connected firm are high. This finding is 
consistent with the argument of Guedhami et al. (2014) 
that politically connected firms prefer auditors who will 
likely tolerate their earnings manipulation approach, which 
is consistent with the findings of Chaney et al. (2011) 
that earnings quality in politically connected firms is low. 
TABLE 2. Sample selection
Panel A: Sample selection Number Percentage
Initial sample of firms with sectors reported in (NSE) for the year 2013
Less: firms operating in the financial sector
Less: firms in agriculture sector 
Less: firms with missing annual reports 
Final sample 
181
56
5
31
89
100.00
30.9
2.80
17.1
49.1
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry Number Percentage
Consumer 
Service 
Conglomerate 
Industrial goods 
Natural Resources 
27
22
15
15
10
30.0
25.0
16.9
16.9
11.2
Total 89 100.0
TABLE 3. Distribution of politically connected boards
Year Number of firms (PCB and 
Non-PCB)
PCB Non-PCB Percentage of PCB 
(%)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
56
66
71
77
73
66
35
41
42
46
44
40
21
25
29
31
29
26
63
62
59
60
60
61
Total 409 248 161
Notes: This table presents the time distribution of firms with at least one politically connected board member. A connected firm had 
an indicator variable equal to one if at least one member of the board of directors was politically connected and 0 if otherwise. PCB 
= politically connected board; Non-PCB = non-politically connected board.
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TABLE 4. Summary statistics for politically connected firms (PCB) and 
non-politically connected firms (NON-PCB)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Number of 
Observations
Significance 
of difference
PCB NON-PCB PCB NON-PCB PCB NON-PCB
ABD
ABEXP
ABNCFO
LOSS
TA
BIG4
AF
GROWTH
BLCKHLD
ACCTNSTD
QUICK
RLAG
BUSY
NONEXC_
-1.605
-1.523
-1.753
0.07
37400000
0.69
21594.39
0.00
4.85
0.34
1.55
117.13
0.67
0.70
-1.897
-0.723
-1.463
0.11
12100000
0.65
11862.39
-0.01
8.66
0.35
0.98
129.81
0.69
0.68
2.914
2.826
2.812
0.26
75900000
0.48
32873.05
0.10
14.78
0.03
0.31
54.45
0.46
0.18
2.511
2.057
2.523
0.31
22100000
0.46
17802.98
0.15
11.29
0.04
0.08
70.06
0.47
0.17
248
248
248
241
248
248
248
248
248
248
248
248
248
248
161
161
161
158
161
161
161
161
161
161
161
161
161
161
-1.9572
Ns
Ns
Ns
-4.1189
Ns
-3.4420
Ns
2.9448
Ns
Ns
2.0501
Ns
-2.4311
Notes: The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric independent sample t-test is used to examine whether a significant difference exists between the samples 
of politically connected firms and non-politically connected firms. Meanwhile, significant differences in dummy variables are assessed using the chi-square test. 
Lending further credence to Chaney et al. (2011) findings, 
Abdulmalik et al. (2016) document that politically 
connected firms are likely to appoint auditors that have 
a higher tolerance for the level of earnings management 
among politically connected firms. 
 The control variables indicate that firms recording net 
income less than 1 are associated with accrual earnings 
management. Although the result is not significant, 
large firms and those audited by Big 4 firms are not 
associated with high accrual earnings management. 
Meanwhile, the natural logarithms of audit fees (LOGAF) 
have a significant and negative relationship with earnings 
management proxies. The coefficient of the adoption of 
IFRS (ACCTNSTD) is associated with an increase in the 
level of tolerance of accrual earnings management by the 
auditors. Overall, the results of ABD estimation support 
the argument that auditors of politically connected firms 
are more likely to tolerate accrual earnings management.
 Next, the results of the REM model are shown 
in Table 6. A negative association is found between 
politically connected boards and the three proxies of real 
earnings management (ABEXP, ABCFO, and ABCFO). The 
coefficient of PCB in the ABCFO model is not significant 
considering the conventional level of significance for 
ABCFO. Juxtaposing the results obtained from the REM 
model with those from the ABD model indicates that 
auditors of politically connected firms are less likely 
to tolerate real earnings management even though the 
earnings management approach is not easily detectable 
by regulators (Cohen et al. 2008). The REM approach is 
costlier as it has more negative future consequences on 
cash flow because it alters the real operations of a firm to 
achieve desirable outcomes for managers (Roychowdhury 
2006). The results are consistent with the findings of 
Sohn (2011), which indicate that auditors incorporate 
the implication of litigation risks arising from the 
manipulation activities of clients that are associated with 
real earnings management into their audit-pricing model. 
Impliedly, auditors charge more for client that employ 
real earnings management and will most likely not have 
tolerance for this earnings management approach when 
detected. 
 The coefficient for the control variables suggests that 
LOSS, SIZE, BIG4 and GROWTH are negative and significant 
in the ABEXP model. LOSS and SIZE are not significant 
in the ABCFO and REM_AGG model. BIG4 is negative and 
significant in the ABEXP, ABCFO and REM_AGG models, 
while GROWTH is negative and significant in all models. 
Finally, ACCTNSTD is positive and significant in all 
models. 
 Table 7 reports the results of the relationship between 
the three proxies of real earnings management and 
absolute discretionary accrual in politically connected 
firms. All models exhibit a positive association between 
ABD and REM, as reflected by the positive coefficient (that 
was significant at the .01 level). However, the effect is 
higher in firms with politically connected boardroom. 
The coefficient estimates on ABD_PCB are positive and 
larger in magnitude than the positive coefficient estimates 
for ABD. This relationship is, however, significant in 
model ABEXP and REM_AGG as measures of RM (0.196 
with a p-value of .01 and 0.140 with a p-value of .05, 
respectively). By implication, the positive coefficient of 
ABD_PCB suggests a complementary relationship exists 
between accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management in politically connected firms. This finding 
is consistent with Zang (2011), which provides evidence 
suggesting that managers alternate between accrual 
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TABLE 6. Tests of the relationship between earnings management measures and politically connected board
ACCRUAL EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT
REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
(RM)
Variable ABD ABEXP ABCFO REM_AGG VIF
PCB 0.400
(1.93**)
-0.580
(-4.66***)
-0.280
(-1.39)
-0.841
(-2.74***)
LOSS 0.580
(1.68*)
-0.620
(-1.99***)
0.290
-0.940
0.170
-0.270 1.14
SIZE 0.290
(-1.43)
-0.320
(-1.98**)
0.100
-0.460
-0.494
(-1.52) 2.67
BIG4 -0.060
(-0.24)
-0.570
(-4.14***)
-0.630
(-2.85***)
-0.952
(-2.85***) 1.63
LOGAF -0.990
(-2.70***)
-0.380
(-1.410)
0.080
(-0.21)
0.090
(-0.14) 3.42
GROWTH 0.000
(-2.10***)
0.000
(-4.22***)
0.000
(-2.92***)
0.000
(-8.47***) 1.07
BLCKHLD -0.020
(-5.21***)
0.010
(-1.55)
-0.010
(-1.80**)
-0.012
(-1.18) 1.26
ACCTNSTD 1.000
(3.47***)
0.520
(2.75***)
0.510
(2.09***)
0.771
(2.244***) 1.17
QUICK -0.620
(-2.95***)
0.980
(6.41***)
-0.410
(-2.35***)
-0.026
(-0.09) 1.10
RLAG 0.000
(-2.71***)
0.000
-0.780
-0.010
(-4.72***)
-1.565
(-4.41***) 1.19
BUSY 0.280
(-1.32)
-0.020
(-0.18)
-0.610
(-3.09***)
-0.367
(-1.19) 1.10
NONEXC_ -1.070
(-1.93**)
-0.700
(-1.60*)
-0.950
(-2.34***)
-1.476
(-1.86***) 1.12
INDUSTRY EFFECT YES YES YES YES
YEAR EFFECT YES YES YES YES
_cons 0.53
(-0.48)
3.44
(3.17***)
-0.81
(-0.64)
9.18
(3.26***)
Prob > chi2
No of observations
0.000
392
0.000
392
0.000
392
0.000
392
Mean VIF 1.45
Note: The p-values are for two-tailed significance at the * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels. 
TABLE 7. Test of the relationship between ABD and RM 
in politically connected boardrooms
Variable ABEXP ABCFO REM_AGG
ABD 0.144
(3.00***)
0.670
(12.92***)
0.865
(13.20***)
PCB -0.522
(-2.98***)
-0.603
(-2.96***)
-0.868
(-3.012***)
ABD_PCB 0.196
(3.46***)
-0.019
(-0.32)
0.140
(1.75**)
Control variables YES YES YES
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of observations 392 392 392
Note: The p-values are for two-tailed significance at the * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels.
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earnings management and real earnings management 
depending on the benefit of an individual method of 
earnings management irrespective of corporate events or 
a specific period.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates auditor’s earnings management 
tolerance vis-á-vis accrual earnings management and real 
earnings management in firms with politically connected 
board members. Auditor reputation theory and auditor 
litigation risks are used as a theoretical framework. The 
two theories state that auditors have incentives to deliver a 
high-quality audit due to the value of quality audit report to 
a client; and to avoid potential litigation costs arising from 
audit failure. The study predicted that, because auditors 
are concerned with litigation risks and their reputations, 
they are less likely to tolerate real earnings management 
due to its severe implications compared to accrual-based 
management. In addition, a relationship was predicted 
to exist between real earnings management and accrual-
based management for firms with politically connected 
board members. 
 Using 409 observations drawn from 89 listed 
companies on Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2013, 
the results suggest that auditors are more tolerant of accrual 
earnings management and less tolerant of real earnings 
management in firms that have board members that are 
politically connected. A negative coefficient is also found 
for the interaction of accrual earnings management and a 
politically connected board, suggesting a complementary 
relationship between REM and ABD in firms that have 
politically connected board members. The complementary 
relationship suggests that management in firms with 
politically connected boardroom use the two earnings 
management methods jointly and simultaneously. The 
findings are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation with alternatives measures of real earnings 
management (i.e., abnormal discretionary cash flow from 
operations; abnormal production costs; and aggregate 
measure of real earnings management). The findings of this 
study have serious implications for regulators, particularly 
following corporate governance scandals that affect the 
integrity of the financial information. Because a financial 
statement is the outcome of a joint negotiation between 
the auditor and the client, the present findings that auditors 
are less tolerant of real earnings management suggest that 
regulators, in addition to increasing scrutiny on auditor-
client discretionary reporting, should also consider the 
preference for other earnings management proxies, such 
as real earnings management. 
 The findings of the present study are not without 
limitations. First, in the present study, boardroom 
political connections (i.e., board members having political 
connections) serves as the measure of political connection. 
However, this study did not investigate the proportion of 
firm shares held by individuals or corporate organisations 
that have political influence due to inadequate ownership 
disclosures. Future studies could enhance understanding 
from the perspective of shareholding structure of perceived 
connected firms. 
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